fix #81744: Password_verify() always return true with some hash

  CVE-2023-0567
fix #81746: 1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code
  CVE-2023-0568
fix DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart request body
  CVE-2023-0662

5 files changed, 459 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/failed.txt b/failed.txt
index 429705b..c45af41 100644
--- a/failed.txt
+++ b/failed.txt
@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
-===== 7.2.34-12 (2022-09-29)
+===== 7.2.34-16 (2023-02-14)
 
 $ grep -ar 'Tests failed' /var/lib/mock/*/build.log
 
 /var/lib/mock/scl72el7x/build.log:Tests failed    :     0
-/var/lib/mock/scl72el8x/build.log:Tests failed    :    18
-/var/lib/mock/scl72fc35x/build.log:Tests failed    :   18
+/var/lib/mock/scl72el8x/build.log:Tests failed    :    20
 
 
-el8x
-	4	Bug #48097 (date_timezone_set function produces wrong datetime result) [ext/date/tests/bug48097.phpt]
-el8x, fc33x, fc34x:
-	3	buildroot issue with strict openssl policy (fixed in 7.4)
-fc33x, fc34x, fc35x
-	4	Bug #33415 [2] (Possibly invalid non-one-hour DST or timezone shifts) [ext/date/tests/bug33415-2.phpt]
+el7x:
+	3	ext/openssl/tests/openssl_x509_checkpurpose_basic.phpt
+el8x:
+	3	buildroot issue with strict openssl policy (fixed in 7.4) and tzdata
 
 
 (1)	proc_open give erratic test results :(
@@ -20,4 +17,3 @@ fc33x, fc34x, fc35x
 (3)	known issue
 (4)	tzdata related
 (5)	need investigation
-
diff --git a/php-bug81744.patch b/php-bug81744.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2864136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/php-bug81744.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+From 77e6dd89b92c3c7b3191e53508b1cd1744a89208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20D=C3=BCsterhus?= <tim@bastelstu.be>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 21:15:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] crypt: Fix validation of malformed BCrypt hashes
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+PHP’s implementation of crypt_blowfish differs from the upstream Openwall
+version by adding a “PHP Hack”, which allows one to cut short the BCrypt salt
+by including a `$` character within the characters that represent the salt.
+
+Hashes that are affected by the “PHP Hack” may erroneously validate any
+password as valid when used with `password_verify` and when comparing the
+return value of `crypt()` against the input.
+
+The PHP Hack exists since the first version of PHP’s own crypt_blowfish
+implementation that was added in 1e820eca02dcf322b41fd2fe4ed2a6b8309f8ab5.
+
+No clear reason is given for the PHP Hack’s existence. This commit removes it,
+because BCrypt hashes containing a `$` character in their salt are not valid
+BCrypt hashes.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c840f71524067aa474c00c3eacfb83bd860bfc8a)
+(cherry picked from commit 7437aaae38cf4b3357e7580f9e22fd4a403b6c23)
+---
+ ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c                 |  8 --
+ .../tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt       | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c b/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c
+index 5cf306715f..e923b55ed0 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c
++++ b/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c
+@@ -377,7 +377,6 @@ static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = {
+ #define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
+ { \
+ 	tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
+-	if (tmp == '$') break; /* PHP hack */ \
+ 	if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
+ 	tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
+ 	if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
+@@ -405,13 +404,6 @@ static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size)
+ 		*dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4;
+ 	} while (dptr < end);
+ 
+-	if (end - dptr == size) {
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-
+-	while (dptr < end) /* PHP hack */
+-		*dptr++ = 0;
+-
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..32e335f4b0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
++--TEST--
++bcrypt correctly rejects salts containing $
++--FILE--
++<?php
++for ($i = 0; $i < 23; $i++) {
++	$salt = '$2y$04$' . str_repeat('0', $i) . '$';
++	$result = crypt("foo", $salt);
++	var_dump($salt);
++	var_dump($result);
++	var_dump($result === $salt);
++}
++?>
++--EXPECT--
++string(8) "$2y$04$$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(9) "$2y$04$0$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(10) "$2y$04$00$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(11) "$2y$04$000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(12) "$2y$04$0000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(13) "$2y$04$00000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(14) "$2y$04$000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(15) "$2y$04$0000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(16) "$2y$04$00000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(17) "$2y$04$000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(18) "$2y$04$0000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(19) "$2y$04$00000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(20) "$2y$04$000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(21) "$2y$04$0000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(22) "$2y$04$00000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(23) "$2y$04$000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(24) "$2y$04$0000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(25) "$2y$04$00000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(26) "$2y$04$000000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(27) "$2y$04$0000000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(28) "$2y$04$00000000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(29) "$2y$04$000000000000000000000$"
++string(2) "*0"
++bool(false)
++string(30) "$2y$04$0000000000000000000000$"
++string(60) "$2y$04$000000000000000000000u2a2UpVexIt9k3FMJeAVr3c04F5tcI8K"
++bool(false)
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From c57400002961b6df74960c52777ad0fb3dbeabea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20D=C3=BCsterhus?= <tim@bastelstu.be>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 22:13:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] crypt: Fix possible buffer overread in php_crypt()
+
+(cherry picked from commit a92acbad873a05470af1a47cb785a18eadd827b5)
+(cherry picked from commit ed0281b588a6840cb95f3134a4e68847a3be5bb7)
+---
+ ext/standard/crypt.c                                   | 1 +
+ ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt | 8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/crypt.c b/ext/standard/crypt.c
+index e873ca7946..c391cfd3f6 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/crypt.c
++++ b/ext/standard/crypt.c
+@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ PHPAPI zend_string *php_crypt(const char *password, const int pass_len, const ch
+ 		} else if (
+ 				salt[0] == '$' &&
+ 				salt[1] == '2' &&
++				salt[2] != 0 &&
+ 				salt[3] == '$') {
+ 			char output[PHP_MAX_SALT_LEN + 1];
+ 
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..085bc8a239
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++--TEST--
++Test that password_hash() does not overread buffers when a short hash is passed
++--FILE--
++<?php
++var_dump(password_verify("foo", '$2'));
++?>
++--EXPECT--
++bool(false)
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/php-bug81746.patch b/php-bug81746.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c654709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/php-bug81746.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From 3640e9897928d5b5607270c20593a0c04a455e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 19:28:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Fix array overrun when appending slash to paths
+
+Fix it by extending the array sizes by one character. As the input is
+limited to the maximum path length, there will always be place to append
+the slash. As the php_check_specific_open_basedir() simply uses the
+strings to compare against each other, no new failures related to too
+long paths are introduced.
+We'll let the DOM and XML case handle a potentially too long path in the
+library code.
+
+(cherry picked from commit ec10b28d64decbc54aa1e585dce580f0bd7a5953)
+(cherry picked from commit 887cd0710ad856a0d22c329b6ea6c71ebd8621ae)
+---
+ ext/dom/document.c            | 2 +-
+ ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c | 2 +-
+ main/fopen_wrappers.c         | 6 +++---
+ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/dom/document.c b/ext/dom/document.c
+index 11ef4aa818..c212faa695 100644
+--- a/ext/dom/document.c
++++ b/ext/dom/document.c
+@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static xmlDocPtr dom_document_parser(zval *id, int mode, char *source, size_t so
+ 	int validate, recover, resolve_externals, keep_blanks, substitute_ent;
+ 	int resolved_path_len;
+ 	int old_error_reporting = 0;
+-	char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
+ 
+ 	if (id != NULL) {
+ 		intern = Z_DOMOBJ_P(id);
+diff --git a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c
+index 6c1da2761d..0f2b62ae20 100644
+--- a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c
++++ b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c
+@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, XML)
+ 	xmlreader_object *intern = NULL;
+ 	char *source, *uri = NULL, *encoding = NULL;
+ 	int resolved_path_len, ret = 0;
+-	char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
+ 	xmlParserInputBufferPtr inputbfr;
+ 	xmlTextReaderPtr reader;
+ 
+diff --git a/main/fopen_wrappers.c b/main/fopen_wrappers.c
+index 520edfadbb..33047bb160 100644
+--- a/main/fopen_wrappers.c
++++ b/main/fopen_wrappers.c
+@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ PHPAPI ZEND_INI_MH(OnUpdateBaseDir)
+ */
+ PHPAPI int php_check_specific_open_basedir(const char *basedir, const char *path)
+ {
+-	char resolved_name[MAXPATHLEN];
+-	char resolved_basedir[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char resolved_name[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
++	char resolved_basedir[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
+ 	char local_open_basedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+-	char path_tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char path_tmp[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
+ 	char *path_file;
+ 	size_t resolved_basedir_len;
+ 	size_t resolved_name_len;
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 2b9c9a8cb00914c08e34ee242d4aa3ba4aa74ef4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 11:46:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] NEWS
+
+(cherry picked from commit 614468ce4056c0ef93aae09532dcffdf65b594b5)
+---
+ NEWS | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index 1c00ef6357..ad57c5ccd5 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
+ PHP                                                                        NEWS
+ |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
+ 
++Backported from 8.0.28
++
++- Core:
++  . Fixed bug #81744 (Password_verify() always return true with some hash).
++    (CVE-2023-0567). (Tim Düsterhus)
++  . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code).
++    (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche)
++
+ Backported from 8.0.27
+ 
+ - PDO/SQLite:
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/php-cve-2023-0662.patch b/php-cve-2023-0662.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07361d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/php-cve-2023-0662.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 1548e88ea16f68d15a71040c7fb6bff3874c5e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Zelenka <bukka@php.net>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 14:11:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix repeated warning for file uploads limit exceeding
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3a2fdef1ae38881110006616ee1f0534b082ca45)
+---
+ main/rfc1867.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/main/rfc1867.c b/main/rfc1867.c
+index 27718e72a4..3f7a0c76f9 100644
+--- a/main/rfc1867.c
++++ b/main/rfc1867.c
+@@ -932,7 +932,10 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */
+ 				skip_upload = 1;
+ 			} else if (upload_cnt <= 0) {
+ 				skip_upload = 1;
+-				sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded");
++				if (upload_cnt == 0) {
++					--upload_cnt;
++					sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded");
++				}
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			/* Return with an error if the posted data is garbled */
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 7d196fe1295491e624edf263525148c8c3bfd902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Zelenka <bukka@php.net>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 14:31:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] Introduce max_multipart_body_parts INI
+
+This fixes GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv DOS vulnerabality by limitting number of
+parsed multipart body parts as currently all parts were always parsed.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 8ec78d28d20c82c75c4747f44c52601cfdb22516)
+---
+ main/main.c    |  1 +
+ main/rfc1867.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/main/main.c b/main/main.c
+index a3fc980b17..0cfdb91368 100644
+--- a/main/main.c
++++ b/main/main.c
+@@ -621,6 +621,7 @@ PHP_INI_BEGIN()
+ 	PHP_INI_ENTRY("disable_functions",			"",			PHP_INI_SYSTEM,		NULL)
+ 	PHP_INI_ENTRY("disable_classes",			"",			PHP_INI_SYSTEM,		NULL)
+ 	PHP_INI_ENTRY("max_file_uploads",			"20",			PHP_INI_SYSTEM|PHP_INI_PERDIR,		NULL)
++	PHP_INI_ENTRY("max_multipart_body_parts",	"-1",			PHP_INI_SYSTEM|PHP_INI_PERDIR,		NULL)
+ 
+ 	STD_PHP_INI_BOOLEAN("allow_url_fopen",		"1",		PHP_INI_SYSTEM,		OnUpdateBool,		allow_url_fopen,		php_core_globals,		core_globals)
+ 	STD_PHP_INI_BOOLEAN("allow_url_include",	"0",		PHP_INI_SYSTEM,		OnUpdateBool,		allow_url_include,		php_core_globals,		core_globals)
+diff --git a/main/rfc1867.c b/main/rfc1867.c
+index 3f7a0c76f9..14813a300c 100644
+--- a/main/rfc1867.c
++++ b/main/rfc1867.c
+@@ -704,6 +704,7 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */
+ 	void *event_extra_data = NULL;
+ 	unsigned int llen = 0;
+ 	int upload_cnt = INI_INT("max_file_uploads");
++	int body_parts_cnt = INI_INT("max_multipart_body_parts");
+ 	const zend_encoding *internal_encoding = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding();
+ 	php_rfc1867_getword_t getword;
+ 	php_rfc1867_getword_conf_t getword_conf;
+@@ -725,6 +726,11 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (body_parts_cnt < 0) {
++		body_parts_cnt = PG(max_input_vars) + upload_cnt;
++	}
++	int body_parts_limit = body_parts_cnt;
++
+ 	/* Get the boundary */
+ 	boundary = strstr(content_type_dup, "boundary");
+ 	if (!boundary) {
+@@ -809,6 +815,11 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */
+ 			char *pair = NULL;
+ 			int end = 0;
+ 
++			if (--body_parts_cnt < 0) {
++				php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Multipart body parts limit exceeded %d. To increase the limit change max_multipart_body_parts in php.ini.", body_parts_limit);
++				goto fileupload_done;
++			}
++
+ 			while (isspace(*cd)) {
+ 				++cd;
+ 			}
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 7900df2bfa37eaf0217fd2d62f3418b0be096cba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
+Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 09:14:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 7/8] NEWS
+
+(cherry picked from commit 472db3ee3a00ac00d36019eee0b3b7362334481c)
+---
+ NEWS | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index ad57c5ccd5..e59c43300a 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ Backported from 8.0.28
+   . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code).
+     (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche)
+ 
++- FPM:
++  . Fixed bug GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv (DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart
++    request body). (CVE-2023-0662) (Jakub Zelenka)
++
+ Backported from 8.0.27
+ 
+ - PDO/SQLite:
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 27d1f29635717f619267b5e2ebf87ec43faa18f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
+Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 11:47:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] fix NEWS, not FPM specific
+
+(cherry picked from commit c04f310440a906fc4ca885f4ecf6e3e4cd36edc7)
+---
+ NEWS | 2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index e59c43300a..47e9f89a64 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ Backported from 8.0.28
+     (CVE-2023-0567). (Tim Düsterhus)
+   . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code).
+     (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche)
+-
+-- FPM:
+   . Fixed bug GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv (DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart
+     request body). (CVE-2023-0662) (Jakub Zelenka)
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/php.spec b/php.spec
index ba0f09d..900e02f 100644
--- a/php.spec
+++ b/php.spec
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
 Summary: PHP scripting language for creating dynamic web sites
 Name: %{?scl_prefix}php
 Version: %{upver}%{?rcver:~%{rcver}}
-Release: 15%{?dist}
+Release: 16%{?dist}
 # All files licensed under PHP version 3.01, except
 # Zend is licensed under Zend
 # TSRM is licensed under BSD
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ Patch210: php-bug81727.patch
 Patch211: php-bug81726.patch
 Patch212: php-bug81738.patch
 Patch213: php-bug81740.patch
+Patch214: php-bug81744.patch
+Patch215: php-bug81746.patch
+Patch216: php-cve-2023-0662.patch
 
 # Fixes for tests (300+)
 # Factory is droped from system tzdata
@@ -979,6 +982,9 @@ sed -e 's/php-devel/%{?scl_prefix}php-devel/' -i scripts/phpize.in
 %patch211 -p1 -b .bug81726
 %patch212 -p1 -b .bug81738
 %patch213 -p1 -b .bug81740
+%patch214 -p1 -b .bug81744
+%patch215 -p1 -b .bug81746
+%patch216 -p1 -b .cve0662
 
 # Fixes for tests
 %patch300 -p1 -b .datetests
@@ -1949,6 +1955,14 @@ EOF
 
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Feb 14 2023 Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net> - 7.2.34-16
+- fix #81744: Password_verify() always return true with some hash
+  CVE-2023-0567
+- fix #81746: 1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code
+  CVE-2023-0568
+- fix DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart request body
+  CVE-2023-0662
+
 * Mon Dec 19 2022 Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net> - 7.2.34-15
 - pdo: fix #81740: PDO::quote() may return unquoted string
   CVE-2022-31631