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From b9e09489f8160eb5e38a11e84ef6c8b74c2ec828 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2023 15:05:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix missing randomness check and insufficient random bytes
 for SOAP HTTP Digest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

If php_random_bytes_throw fails, the nonce will be uninitialized, but
still sent to the server. The client nonce is intended to protect
against a malicious server. See section 5.10 and 5.12 of RFC 7616 [1],
and bullet point 2 below.

Tim pointed out that even though it's the MD5 of the nonce that gets sent,
enumerating 31 bits is trivial. So we have still a stack information leak
of 31 bits.

Furthermore, Tim found the following issues:
* The small size of cnonce might cause the server to erroneously reject
  a request due to a repeated (cnonce, nc) pair. As per the birthday
  problem 31 bits of randomness will return a duplication with 50%
  chance after less than 55000 requests and nc always starts counting at 1.
* The cnonce is intended to protect the client and password against a
  malicious server that returns a constant server nonce where the server
  precomputed a rainbow table between passwords and correct client response.
  As storage is fairly cheap, a server could precompute the client responses
  for (a subset of) client nonces and still have a chance of reversing the
  client response with the same probability as the cnonce duplication.

  Precomputing the rainbow table for all 2^31 cnonces increases the rainbow
  table size by factor 2 billion, which is infeasible. But precomputing it
  for 2^14 cnonces only increases the table size by factor 16k and the server
  would still have a 10% chance of successfully reversing a password with a
  single client request.

This patch fixes the issues by increasing the nonce size, and checking
the return value of php_random_bytes_throw(). In the process we also get
rid of the MD5 hashing of the nonce.

[1] RFC 7616: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616

Co-authored-by: Tim Düsterhus <timwolla@php.net>
(cherry picked from commit 126d517ce240e9f638d9a5eaa509eaca49ef562a)
(cherry picked from commit 0cfca9aa1395271833848daec0bace51d965531d)
---
 NEWS                |  6 ++++++
 ext/soap/php_http.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 11f6e7ad5a8..0770d913467 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
 PHP                                                                        NEWS
 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 
+Backported from 8.0.29
+
+- Soap:
+  . Fixed bug GHSA-76gg-c692-v2mw (Missing error check and insufficient random
+    bytes in HTTP Digest authentication for SOAP). (nielsdos, timwolla)
+
 Backported from 8.0.28
 
 - Core:
diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c
index 3a890d7c36f..3bfa4f6f54c 100644
--- a/ext/soap/php_http.c
+++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c
@@ -646,14 +646,23 @@ int make_http_soap_request(zval        *this_ptr,
 			if ((digest = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1)) != NULL) {
 				if (Z_TYPE_P(digest) == IS_ARRAY) {
 					char          HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9];
+					unsigned char nonce[16];
 					PHP_MD5_CTX   md5ctx;
 					unsigned char hash[16];
 
-					PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
-					snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), ZEND_LONG_FMT, php_rand());
-					PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce));
-					PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
-					make_digest(cnonce, hash);
+					if (UNEXPECTED(php_random_bytes_throw(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)) != SUCCESS)) {
+						ZEND_ASSERT(EG(exception));
+						php_stream_close(stream);
+						zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1);
+						zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
+						zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
+						smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
+						smart_str_free(&soap_headers);
+						return FALSE;
+					}
+
+					php_hash_bin2hex(cnonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+					cnonce[32] = 0;
 
 					if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc")-1)) != NULL &&
 					    Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
From e4dd20803ac5579deec54dc6b699d359890f96f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 18:05:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix GH-11382 add missing hash header for bin2hex

(cherry picked from commit 40439039c224bb8cdebd1b7b3d03b8cc11e7cce7)
---
 ext/soap/php_http.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c
index 3bfa4f6f54..72b5bdec2b 100644
--- a/ext/soap/php_http.c
+++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
 #include "php_soap.h"
 #include "ext/standard/base64.h"
 #include "ext/standard/md5.h"
-#include "ext/standard/php_rand.h"
+#include "ext/standard/php_random.h"
+#include "ext/hash/php_hash.h"
 
 static char *get_http_header_value(char *headers, char *type);
 static zend_string *get_http_body(php_stream *socketd, int close, char *headers);