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diff -rup curl-7.15.5.orig/lib/ssluse.c curl-7.15.5/lib/ssluse.c
--- curl-7.15.5.orig/lib/ssluse.c 2006-07-20 22:05:54.000000000 +0200
+++ curl-7.15.5/lib/ssluse.c 2009-08-07 11:41:18.181920711 +0200
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
if(check->type == target) {
/* get data and length */
const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
- int altlen;
+ size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
switch(target) {
case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
@@ -943,14 +943,16 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
"I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
*/
- if (cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
+ /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
+ string and we cannot match it. */
+ cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
matched = TRUE;
break;
case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
/* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
our server IP address is */
- altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
matched = TRUE;
break;
@@ -990,18 +992,27 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
- if (tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
- j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
- if (j >= 0) {
- peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
- if (peer_CN) {
- memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
- peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ if(tmp) {
+ if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+ if(peer_CN) {
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
}
}
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+
+ if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
+ /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
+ cannot match and we return failure! */
+ failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
+ res = CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
}
- else /* not a UTF8 name */
- j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
}
if (peer_CN == nulstr)
@@ -1018,7 +1029,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
}
#endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
- if (!peer_CN) {
+ if(res)
+ /* error already detected, pass through */
+ ;
+ else if(!peer_CN) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
failf(data,
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
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