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authorRemi Collet <fedora@famillecollet.com>2011-08-16 14:54:44 +0200
committerRemi Collet <fedora@famillecollet.com>2011-08-16 14:54:44 +0200
commit68c18b79288431ab4e477cc3f59ef4ccfe3e7355 (patch)
treee8ec04eaa888f78e1772bf959ee76461e3252d69 /curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
import curl-7.15.5-9.el5_6.3 from EL-5
Diffstat (limited to 'curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch')
-rw-r--r--curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch80
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch b/curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b479d91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/curl-7.15.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+diff -rup curl-7.15.5.orig/lib/ssluse.c curl-7.15.5/lib/ssluse.c
+--- curl-7.15.5.orig/lib/ssluse.c 2006-07-20 22:05:54.000000000 +0200
++++ curl-7.15.5/lib/ssluse.c 2009-08-07 11:41:18.181920711 +0200
+@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+ if(check->type == target) {
+ /* get data and length */
+ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+- int altlen;
++ size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+
+ switch(target) {
+ case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+@@ -943,14 +943,16 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+ "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+ it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+ */
+- if (cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
++ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
++ /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
++ string and we cannot match it. */
++ cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+ matched = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+ /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+ our server IP address is */
+- altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+ if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
+ matched = TRUE;
+ break;
+@@ -990,18 +992,27 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+ string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+ conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+ brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+- if (tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+- j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+- if (j >= 0) {
+- peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+- if (peer_CN) {
+- memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+- peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++ if(tmp) {
++ if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
++ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
++ if(j >= 0) {
++ peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
++ if(peer_CN) {
++ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
++ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++ }
+ }
+ }
++ else /* not a UTF8 name */
++ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
++
++ if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
++ /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
++ cannot match and we return failure! */
++ failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
++ res = CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
++ }
+ }
+- else /* not a UTF8 name */
+- j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+ }
+
+ if (peer_CN == nulstr)
+@@ -1018,7 +1029,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+ }
+ #endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
+
+- if (!peer_CN) {
++ if(res)
++ /* error already detected, pass through */
++ ;
++ else if(!peer_CN) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");