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-rw-r--r--bug66387.patch57
-rw-r--r--bug72275.patch59
-rw-r--r--bug72298.patch93
-rw-r--r--bug72339.patch127
-rw-r--r--bug72340.patch66
-rw-r--r--bug72400.patch113
-rw-r--r--bug72402.patch284
-rw-r--r--bug72433.patch113
-rw-r--r--bug72434.patch78
-rw-r--r--bug72446.patch30
-rw-r--r--bug72455.patch39
-rw-r--r--failed.txt7
-rw-r--r--php54.spec47
13 files changed, 1109 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/bug66387.patch b/bug66387.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51291ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug66387.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From f96ebb098697908641c6d37e1149cde1f90417fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Christoph M. Becker" <cmb@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 23:24:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix #66387: Stack overflow with imagefilltoborder
+
+The stack overflow is caused by the recursive algorithm in combination with a
+very large negative coordinate passed to gdImageFillToBorder(). As there is
+already a clipping for large positive coordinates to the width and height of
+the image, it seems to be consequent to clip to zero also.
+---
+ ext/gd/libgd/gd.c | 4 ++++
+ ext/gd/tests/bug66387.phpt | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/gd/tests/bug66387.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c b/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
+index d73f094..2c63aac 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
++++ b/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
+@@ -1770,9 +1770,13 @@ void gdImageFillToBorder (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int border, int color)
+
+ if (x >= im->sx) {
+ x = im->sx - 1;
++ } else if (x < 0) {
++ x = 0;
+ }
+ if (y >= im->sy) {
+ y = im->sy - 1;
++ } else if (y < 0) {
++ y = 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = x; i >= 0; i--) {
+diff --git a/ext/gd/tests/bug66387.phpt b/ext/gd/tests/bug66387.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..79c49a5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/gd/tests/bug66387.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #66387 (Stack overflow with imagefilltoborder)
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php
++if (!extension_loaded('gd')) die('skip gd extension not available!');
++?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++$im = imagecreatetruecolor(20, 20);
++$c = imagecolorallocate($im, 255, 0, 0);
++imagefilltoborder($im, 0, -999355, $c, $c);
++echo "ready\n";
++?>
++--EXPECT--
++ready
diff --git a/bug72275.patch b/bug72275.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d28651e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72275.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 489fd56fe37bf40a662931c2b4d5baa918f13e37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 23:12:47 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72275: don't allow smart_str to overflow int
+
+---
+ ext/standard/php_smart_str.h | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/php_smart_str.h b/ext/standard/php_smart_str.h
+index 1872fa8..fc1a753 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/php_smart_str.h
++++ b/ext/standard/php_smart_str.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@
+ newlen = (d)->len + (n); \
+ if (newlen >= (d)->a) { \
+ (d)->a = newlen + SMART_STR_PREALLOC; \
++ if (UNEXPECTED((d)->a >= INT_MAX)) { \
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow"); \
++ } \
+ SMART_STR_DO_REALLOC(d, what); \
+ } \
+ } \
+@@ -148,17 +151,17 @@
+ * for GCC compatible compilers, e.g.
+ *
+ * #define f(..) ({char *r;..;__r;})
+- */
+-
++ */
++
+ static inline char *smart_str_print_long(char *buf, long num) {
+- char *r;
+- smart_str_print_long4(buf, num, unsigned long, r);
++ char *r;
++ smart_str_print_long4(buf, num, unsigned long, r);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ static inline char *smart_str_print_unsigned(char *buf, long num) {
+- char *r;
+- smart_str_print_unsigned4(buf, num, unsigned long, r);
++ char *r;
++ smart_str_print_unsigned4(buf, num, unsigned long, r);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+@@ -168,7 +171,7 @@ static inline char *smart_str_print_unsigned(char *buf, long num) {
+ smart_str_print##func##4 (__b + sizeof(__b) - 1, (num), vartype, __t); \
+ smart_str_appendl_ex((dest), __t, __b + sizeof(__b) - 1 - __t, (type)); \
+ } while (0)
+-
++
+ #define smart_str_append_unsigned_ex(dest, num, type) \
+ smart_str_append_generic_ex((dest), (num), (type), unsigned long, _unsigned)
+
diff --git a/bug72298.patch b/bug72298.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..206578e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72298.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From e9ac8954be9f7d988189df44578d759ffdea3512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2016 21:04:33 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72298 pass2_no_dither out-of-bounds access
+
+---
+ ext/gd/libgd/gd_topal.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ ext/gd/tests/bug72298.phpt | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/gd/tests/bug72298.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_topal.c b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_topal.c
+index b9cb928..d8dda45 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_topal.c
++++ b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_topal.c
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
+ * If it is not working, it's not Thomas G. Lane's fault.
+ */
+
+-/*
++/*
+ SETTING THIS ONE CAUSES STRIPED IMAGE
+ to be done: solve this
+ #define ORIGINAL_LIB_JPEG_REVERSE_ODD_ROWS
+@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@
+ * color space, and repeatedly splits the "largest" remaining box until we
+ * have as many boxes as desired colors. Then the mean color in each
+ * remaining box becomes one of the possible output colors.
+- *
++ *
+ * The second pass over the image maps each input pixel to the closest output
+ * color (optionally after applying a Floyd-Steinberg dithering correction).
+ * This mapping is logically trivial, but making it go fast enough requires
+@@ -1320,16 +1320,16 @@ pass2_no_dither (j_decompress_ptr cinfo,
+ #else
+ r = gdTrueColorGetRed (*inptr);
+ g = gdTrueColorGetGreen (*inptr);
+- /*
++ /*
+ 2.0.24: inptr must not be incremented until after
+- transparency check, if any. Thanks to "Super Pikeman."
++ transparency check, if any. Thanks to "Super Pikeman."
+ */
+ b = gdTrueColorGetBlue (*inptr);
+
+ /* If the pixel is transparent, we assign it the palette index that
+ * will later be added at the end of the palette as the transparent
+ * index. */
+- if ((oim->transparent >= 0) && (oim->transparent == *(inptr - 1)))
++ if ((oim->transparent >= 0) && (oim->transparent == *inptr))
+ {
+ *outptr++ = nim->colorsTotal;
+ inptr++;
+@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ static void gdImageTrueColorToPaletteBody (gdImagePtr oim, int dither, int color
+ }
+ } else {
+ nim = oim;
+- }
++ }
+ if (!oim->trueColor)
+ {
+ /* (Almost) nothing to do! */
+@@ -2004,7 +2004,7 @@ static void gdImageTrueColorToPaletteBody (gdImagePtr oim, int dither, int color
+ }
+
+ /* Success! Get rid of the truecolor image data. */
+- if (!cimP) {
++ if (!cimP) {
+ oim->trueColor = 0;
+ /* Junk the truecolor pixels */
+ for (i = 0; i < oim->sy; i++)
+diff --git a/ext/gd/tests/bug72298.phpt b/ext/gd/tests/bug72298.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7fba241
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/gd/tests/bug72298.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72298: pass2_no_dither out-of-bounds access
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php
++ if (!extension_loaded('gd')) die("skip gd extension not available\n");
++?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++$img = imagecreatetruecolor (1 , 1);
++imagecolortransparent($img, 0);
++imagetruecolortopalette($img, false, 4);
++?>
++DONE
++--EXPECT--
++DONE
+\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/bug72339.patch b/bug72339.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da385e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72339.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 7722455726bec8c53458a32851d2a87982cf0eac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pierre Joye <pajoye@php.net>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2016 20:15:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in
+ heap overflow
+
+---
+ ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c | 7 +++++++
+ ext/gd/tests/bug72339.gd | Bin 0 -> 67108882 bytes
+ ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt | 11 +++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/gd/tests/bug72339.gd
+ create mode 100644 ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
+index 6726fee..63e3aef 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
++++ b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
+@@ -138,11 +138,18 @@ static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, in
+ if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
+ nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
+ GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
++ if (overflow2(sidx, nc)) {
++ goto fail1;
++ }
+ sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
+ if (sidx <= 0) {
+ goto fail1;
+ }
+ cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
++ if (cidx == NULL) {
++ goto fail1;
++ }
++
+ for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
+ if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
+ gdFree(cidx);
+diff --git a/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt b/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..763ae71
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php if (!function_exists("imagecreatefromgd2")) print "skip"; ?>
++--FILE--
++<?php imagecreatefromgd2(dirname(__FILE__) . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "bug72339.gd"); ?>
++--EXPECTF--
++Warning: imagecreatefromgd2(): gd warning: product of memory allocation multiplication would exceed INT_MAX, failing operation gracefully
++ in %sbug72339.php on line %d
++
++Warning: imagecreatefromgd2(): '%sbug72339.gd' is not a valid GD2 file in %sbug72339.php on line %d
+
+From 5f107ab8a66f8b36ac0c0b32e0231bf94e083c94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 22:54:55 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] fix tests
+
+---
+ ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
+index 63e3aef..e954aaf 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
++++ b/ext/gd/libgd/gd_gd2.c
+@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, in
+ if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
+ nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
+ GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
+- if (overflow2(sidx, nc)) {
++ if (overflow2(sizeof(t_chunk_info), nc)) {
+ goto fail1;
+ }
+ sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
+
+From 0c7250f260303061425d0d8a348d1a80fa0cc12e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anatol Belski <ab@php.net>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 09:42:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] remove the huge test file, generate it on the fly instead
+
+---
+ ext/gd/tests/bug72339.gd | Bin 67108882 -> 0 bytes
+ ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ delete mode 100644 ext/gd/tests/bug72339.gd
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt b/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
+index 763ae71..2c30ee8 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
++++ b/ext/gd/tests/bug72339.phpt
+@@ -3,7 +3,29 @@ Bug #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
+ --SKIPIF--
+ <?php if (!function_exists("imagecreatefromgd2")) print "skip"; ?>
+ --FILE--
+-<?php imagecreatefromgd2(dirname(__FILE__) . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "bug72339.gd"); ?>
++<?php
++$fname = dirname(__FILE__) . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "bug72339.gd";
++
++$fh = fopen($fname, "w");
++fwrite($fh, "gd2\x00");
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 2));
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 1));
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 1));
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 0x40));
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 2));
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 0x5AA0)); // Chunks Wide
++fwrite($fh, pack("n", 0x5B00)); // Chunks Vertically
++fwrite($fh, str_repeat("\x41\x41\x41\x41", 0x1000000)); // overflow data
++fclose($fh);
++
++$im = imagecreatefromgd2($fname);
++
++if ($im) {
++ imagedestroy($im);
++}
++unlink($fname);
++
++?>
+ --EXPECTF--
+ Warning: imagecreatefromgd2(): gd warning: product of memory allocation multiplication would exceed INT_MAX, failing operation gracefully
+ in %sbug72339.php on line %d
diff --git a/bug72340.patch b/bug72340.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39646e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72340.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From a44c89e8af7c2410f4bfc5e097be2a5d0639a60c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2016 23:18:23 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72340: Double Free Courruption in wddx_deserialize
+
+---
+ ext/wddx/tests/bug72340.phpt | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ ext/wddx/wddx.c | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/wddx/tests/bug72340.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/wddx/tests/bug72340.phpt b/ext/wddx/tests/bug72340.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8d694ca
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/wddx/tests/bug72340.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72340: Double Free Courruption in wddx_deserialize
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php
++if (!extension_loaded("wddx")) print "skip";
++?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++$xml = <<<EOF
++<?xml version='1.0' ?>
++<!DOCTYPE wddxPacket SYSTEM 'wddx_0100.dtd'>
++<wddxPacket version='1.0'>
++ <array><var name="XXXXXXXX"><boolean value="none">TEST</boolean></var>
++ <var name="YYYYYYYY"><var name="ZZZZZZZZ"><var name="EZEZEZEZ">
++ </var></var></var>
++ </array>
++</wddxPacket>
++EOF;
++$array = wddx_deserialize($xml);
++var_dump($array);
++?>
++--EXPECT--
++array(0) {
++}
+diff --git a/ext/wddx/wddx.c b/ext/wddx/wddx.c
+index da34246..311d6aa 100644
+--- a/ext/wddx/wddx.c
++++ b/ext/wddx/wddx.c
+@@ -1096,6 +1096,9 @@ static void php_wddx_process_data(void *user_data, const XML_Char *s, int len)
+ break;
+
+ case ST_BOOLEAN:
++ if(!ent->data) {
++ break;
++ }
+ if (!strcmp(s, "true")) {
+ Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(s, "false")) {
+@@ -1104,6 +1107,7 @@ static void php_wddx_process_data(void *user_data, const XML_Char *s, int len)
+ zval_ptr_dtor(&ent->data);
+ if (ent->varname) {
+ efree(ent->varname);
++ ent->varname = NULL;
+ }
+ ent->data = NULL;
+ }
diff --git a/bug72400.patch b/bug72400.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..363a598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72400.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 88746d60ab3ad51797612ee62603bb3e08d4aac4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 21:46:46 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72400 and #72403 - prevent signed int overflows for
+ string lengths
+
+---
+ ext/standard/string.c | 25 ++++++++++++--
+ ext/standard/url.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/string.c b/ext/standard/string.c
+index 63eede1..acb6a01 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/string.c
++++ b/ext/standard/string.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static char *php_bin2hex(const unsigned char *old, const size_t oldlen, size_t *
+ register unsigned char *result = NULL;
+ size_t i, j;
+
++ if (UNEXPECTED(oldlen * 2 * sizeof(char) > INT_MAX)) {
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+ result = (unsigned char *) safe_emalloc(oldlen, 2 * sizeof(char), 1);
+
+ for (i = j = 0; i < oldlen; i++) {
+@@ -2602,6 +2605,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(quotemeta)
+ char *p, *q;
+ char c;
+ int old_len;
++ size_t new_len;
+
+ if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &old, &old_len) == FAILURE) {
+ return;
+@@ -2636,8 +2640,13 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(quotemeta)
+ }
+ }
+ *q = 0;
++ new_len = q - str;
++ if (UNEXPECTED(new_len > INT_MAX)) {
++ efree(str);
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+
+- RETURN_STRINGL(erealloc(str, q - str + 1), q - str, 0);
++ RETURN_STRINGL(erealloc(str, new_len + 1), new_len, 0);
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
+@@ -3539,7 +3548,7 @@ PHPAPI char *php_addcslashes(const char *str, int length, int *new_length, int s
+ char *source, *target;
+ char *end;
+ char c;
+- int newlen;
++ size_t newlen;
+
+ if (!wlength) {
+ wlength = strlen(what);
+@@ -3570,11 +3579,15 @@ PHPAPI char *php_addcslashes(const char *str, int length, int *new_length, int s
+ }
+ *target = 0;
+ newlen = target - new_str;
++ if (UNEXPECTED(newlen > INT_MAX)) {
++ efree(new_str);
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+ if (target - new_str < length * 4) {
+ new_str = erealloc(new_str, newlen + 1);
+ }
+ if (new_length) {
+- *new_length = newlen;
++ *new_length = (int)newlen;
+ }
+ if (should_free) {
+ STR_FREE((char*)str);
+@@ -3626,6 +3639,9 @@ PHPAPI char *php_addslashes(char *str, int length, int *new_length, int should_f
+
+ *target = 0;
+ *new_length = target - new_str;
++ if (UNEXPECTED(*new_length < 0)) {
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+ if (should_free) {
+ STR_FREE(str);
+ }
+@@ -4329,6 +4345,9 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(nl2br)
+ size_t repl_len = is_xhtml ? (sizeof("<br />") - 1) : (sizeof("<br>") - 1);
+
+ new_length = str_len + repl_cnt * repl_len;
++ if (UNEXPECTED(new_length > INT_MAX)) {
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+ tmp = target = safe_emalloc(repl_cnt, repl_len, str_len + 1);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/url.c b/ext/standard/url.c
+index 27a216a..fc3f080 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/url.c
++++ b/ext/standard/url.c
+@@ -626,6 +626,10 @@ PHPAPI char *php_raw_url_encode(char const *s, int len, int *new_length)
+ if (new_length) {
+ *new_length = y;
+ }
++ if (UNEXPECTED(y > INT_MAX)) {
++ efree(str);
++ zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++ }
+ return ((char *) str);
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
diff --git a/bug72402.patch b/bug72402.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e7243f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72402.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+From 5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2016 21:48:39 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
+
+---
+ ext/mbstring/php_mbregex.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ ext/mbstring/tests/bug72402.phpt | 17 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/mbstring/tests/bug72402.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/mbstring/php_mbregex.c b/ext/mbstring/php_mbregex.c
+index d73c848..6cdee23 100644
+--- a/ext/mbstring/php_mbregex.c
++++ b/ext/mbstring/php_mbregex.c
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #include "ext/standard/info.h"
+ #include "php_mbregex.h"
+ #include "mbstring.h"
+-
++
+ #include "php_onig_compat.h" /* must come prior to the oniguruma header */
+ #include <oniguruma.h>
+ #undef UChar
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ struct _zend_mb_regex_globals {
+ #define MBREX(g) (MBSTRG(mb_regex_globals)->g)
+
+ /* {{{ static void php_mb_regex_free_cache() */
+-static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
++static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
+ {
+ onig_free(*pre);
+ }
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int _php_mb_regex_globals_ctor(zend_mb_regex_globals *pglobals TSRMLS_DC)
+ /* }}} */
+
+ /* {{{ _php_mb_regex_globals_dtor */
+-static void _php_mb_regex_globals_dtor(zend_mb_regex_globals *pglobals TSRMLS_DC)
++static void _php_mb_regex_globals_dtor(zend_mb_regex_globals *pglobals TSRMLS_DC)
+ {
+ zend_hash_destroy(&pglobals->ht_rc);
+ }
+@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patl
+ retval = *rc;
+ }
+ out:
+- return retval;
++ return retval;
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
+@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'i';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+
+ if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND) != 0) {
+@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'x';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+
+ if ((option & (ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE)) ==
+@@ -500,14 +500,14 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'p';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ } else {
+ if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE) != 0) {
+ if (len_left > 0) {
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'm';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+
+ if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE) != 0) {
+@@ -515,22 +515,22 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 's';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+- }
++ }
+ if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST) != 0) {
+ if (len_left > 0) {
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'l';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+ if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY) != 0) {
+ if (len_left > 0) {
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = 'n';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ }
+
+ c = 0;
+@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+ --len_left;
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ }
+- ++len_req;
++ ++len_req;
+ if (len < len_req) {
+ return len_req;
+ }
+@@ -577,11 +577,11 @@ static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionT
+
+ /* {{{ _php_mb_regex_init_options */
+ static void
+-_php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
++_php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
+ {
+ int n;
+ char c;
+- int optm = 0;
++ int optm = 0;
+
+ *syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
+
+@@ -636,13 +636,13 @@ _php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, O
+ *syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+- if (eval != NULL) *eval = 1;
++ if (eval != NULL) *eval = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+- if (option != NULL) *option|=optm;
++ if (option != NULL) *option|=optm;
+ }
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+@@ -860,11 +860,11 @@ static void _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, OnigOp
+ } else {
+ /* FIXME: this code is not multibyte aware! */
+ convert_to_long_ex(arg_pattern_zval);
+- pat_buf[0] = (char)Z_LVAL_PP(arg_pattern_zval);
++ pat_buf[0] = (char)Z_LVAL_PP(arg_pattern_zval);
+ pat_buf[1] = '\0';
+
+ arg_pattern = pat_buf;
+- arg_pattern_len = 1;
++ arg_pattern_len = 1;
+ }
+ /* create regex pattern buffer */
+ re = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, options, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC);
+@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static void _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, OnigOp
+ }
+ }
+ }
+-
++
+ if (eval) {
+ zval v;
+ /* null terminate buffer */
+@@ -953,32 +953,31 @@ static void _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, OnigOp
+ eval_buf.len = 0;
+ zval_dtor(&v);
+ } else if (is_callable) {
+- zval *retval_ptr;
++ zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
+ zval **args[1];
+ zval *subpats;
+ int i;
+-
++
+ MAKE_STD_ZVAL(subpats);
+ array_init(subpats);
+-
++
+ for (i = 0; i < regs->num_regs; i++) {
+ add_next_index_stringl(subpats, string + regs->beg[i], regs->end[i] - regs->beg[i], 1);
+- }
+-
++ }
++
+ args[0] = &subpats;
+ /* null terminate buffer */
+ smart_str_0(&eval_buf);
+-
++
+ arg_replace_fci.param_count = 1;
+ arg_replace_fci.params = args;
+ arg_replace_fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
+- if (zend_call_function(&arg_replace_fci, &arg_replace_fci_cache TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS && arg_replace_fci.retval_ptr_ptr) {
++ if (zend_call_function(&arg_replace_fci, &arg_replace_fci_cache TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS && arg_replace_fci.retval_ptr_ptr && retval_ptr) {
+ convert_to_string_ex(&retval_ptr);
+ smart_str_appendl(&out_buf, Z_STRVAL_P(retval_ptr), Z_STRLEN_P(retval_ptr));
+ eval_buf.len = 0;
+ zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
+ } else {
+- efree(description);
+ if (!EG(exception)) {
+ php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call custom replacement function");
+ }
+@@ -991,7 +990,7 @@ static void _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, OnigOp
+ pos = (OnigUChar *)string + n;
+ } else {
+ if (pos < string_lim) {
+- smart_str_appendl(&out_buf, pos, 1);
++ smart_str_appendl(&out_buf, pos, 1);
+ }
+ pos++;
+ }
+@@ -1013,7 +1012,7 @@ static void _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, OnigOp
+ smart_str_free(&eval_buf);
+
+ if (err <= -2) {
+- smart_str_free(&out_buf);
++ smart_str_free(&out_buf);
+ RETVAL_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ smart_str_appendc(&out_buf, '\0');
+@@ -1063,7 +1062,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(mb_split)
+
+ if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &string, &string_len, &count) == FAILURE) {
+ RETURN_FALSE;
+- }
++ }
+
+ if (count > 0) {
+ count--;
+@@ -1317,7 +1316,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
+ if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
+ return;
+ }
+-
++
+ if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
+ php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
+ RETURN_FALSE;
+@@ -1416,7 +1415,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_setpos)
+ /* }}} */
+
+ /* {{{ php_mb_regex_set_options */
+-static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
++static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
+ {
+ if (prev_options != NULL) {
+ *prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
+diff --git a/ext/mbstring/tests/bug72402.phpt b/ext/mbstring/tests/bug72402.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..abb290b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/mbstring/tests/bug72402.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php extension_loaded('mbstring') or die('skip mbstring not available'); ?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++function throwit() {
++ throw new Exception('it');
++}
++$var10 = "throwit";
++try {
++ $var14 = mb_ereg_replace_callback("", $var10, "");
++} catch(Exception $e) {}
++?>
++DONE
++--EXPECT--
++DONE
+\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/bug72433.patch b/bug72433.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79b7265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72433.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 3f627e580acfdaf0595ae3b115b8bec677f203ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 21:26:33 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed ##72433: Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC
+ algorithm and unserialize
+
+---
+ Zend/tests/gc_024.phpt | 2 +-
+ ext/spl/spl_array.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72433.phpt | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72433.phpt
+
+diff --git a/Zend/tests/gc_024.phpt b/Zend/tests/gc_024.phpt
+index 9a2ceb8..ca78da6 100644
+--- a/Zend/tests/gc_024.phpt
++++ b/Zend/tests/gc_024.phpt
+@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@ var_dump(gc_collect_cycles());
+ echo "ok\n";
+ ?>
+ --EXPECT--
+-int(1)
++int(2)
+ ok
+diff --git a/ext/spl/spl_array.c b/ext/spl/spl_array.c
+index c89cf49..4e03c40 100644
+--- a/ext/spl/spl_array.c
++++ b/ext/spl/spl_array.c
+@@ -831,6 +831,16 @@ static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /*
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
++static HashTable *spl_array_get_gc(zval *object, zval ***gc_data, int *gc_data_count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
++{
++ spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
++
++ *gc_data = &intern->array;
++ *gc_data_count = 1;
++ return zend_std_get_properties(object);
++}
++/* }}} */
++
+ static zval *spl_array_read_property(zval *object, zval *member, int type, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
+ {
+ spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
+@@ -1973,6 +1983,7 @@ PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_array)
+
+ spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_properties = spl_array_get_properties;
+ spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_debug_info = spl_array_get_debug_info;
++ spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_gc = spl_array_get_gc;
+ spl_handler_ArrayObject.read_property = spl_array_read_property;
+ spl_handler_ArrayObject.write_property = spl_array_write_property;
+ spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_property_ptr_ptr = spl_array_get_property_ptr_ptr;
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72433.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72433.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3a2c897
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72433.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72433: Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
++--FILE--
++<?php
++// Fill any potential freed spaces until now.
++$filler = array();
++for($i = 0; $i < 100; $i++)
++ $filler[] = "";
++// Create our payload and unserialize it.
++$serialized_payload = 'a:3:{i:0;r:1;i:1;r:1;i:2;C:11:"ArrayObject":19:{x:i:0;r:1;;m:a:0:{}}}';
++$free_me = unserialize($serialized_payload);
++// We need to increment the reference counter of our ArrayObject s.t. all reference counters of our unserialized array become 0.
++$inc_ref_by_one = $free_me[2];
++// The call to gc_collect_cycles will free '$free_me'.
++gc_collect_cycles();
++// We now have multiple freed spaces. Fill all of them.
++$fill_freed_space_1 = "filler_zval_1";
++$fill_freed_space_2 = "filler_zval_2";
++var_dump($free_me);
++?>
++--EXPECTF--
++array(3) {
++ [0]=>
++ *RECURSION*
++ [1]=>
++ *RECURSION*
++ [2]=>
++ object(ArrayObject)#%d (1) {
++ ["storage":"ArrayObject":private]=>
++ *RECURSION*
++ }
++}
+From 7f428cae88f1294052087e6729f1ecb924b8a18d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 22:13:31 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] fix build
+
+---
+ ext/spl/spl_array.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/spl/spl_array.c b/ext/spl/spl_array.c
+index 4e03c40..5cb7d34 100644
+--- a/ext/spl/spl_array.c
++++ b/ext/spl/spl_array.c
+@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static HashTable *spl_array_get_gc(zval *object, zval ***gc_data, int *gc_data_c
+
+ *gc_data = &intern->array;
+ *gc_data_count = 1;
+- return zend_std_get_properties(object);
++ return zend_std_get_properties(object TSRMLS_CC);
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
diff --git a/bug72434.patch b/bug72434.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e9294d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72434.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 21:35:22 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability
+ in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
+
+---
+ ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72434.phpt | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ ext/zip/php_zip.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72434.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72434.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72434.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1408b8f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/strings/bug72434.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php
++if(!class_exists('zip')) die('ZipArchive');
++?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++// The following array will be serialized and this representation will be freed later on.
++$free_me = array(new StdClass());
++// Create our payload and unserialize it.
++$serialized_payload = 'a:3:{i:1;N;i:2;O:10:"ZipArchive":1:{s:8:"filename";'.serialize($free_me).'}i:1;R:4;}';
++$unserialized_payload = unserialize($serialized_payload);
++gc_collect_cycles();
++// The reference counter for $free_me is at -1 for PHP 7 right now.
++// Increment the reference counter by 1 -> rc is 0
++$a = $unserialized_payload[1];
++// Increment the reference counter by 1 again -> rc is 1
++$b = $a;
++// Trigger free of $free_me (referenced by $m[1]).
++unset($b);
++$fill_freed_space_1 = "filler_zval_1";
++$fill_freed_space_2 = "filler_zval_2";
++$fill_freed_space_3 = "filler_zval_3";
++$fill_freed_space_4 = "filler_zval_4";
++debug_zval_dump($unserialized_payload[1]);
++?>
++--EXPECTF--
++array(1) refcount(1){
++ [0]=>
++ object(stdClass)#%d (0) refcount(3){
++ }
++}
+diff --git a/ext/zip/php_zip.c b/ext/zip/php_zip.c
+index 99c293c..57d060f 100644
+--- a/ext/zip/php_zip.c
++++ b/ext/zip/php_zip.c
+@@ -1015,6 +1015,14 @@ static int php_zip_has_property(zval *object, zval *member, int type, const zend
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+
++static HashTable *php_zip_get_gc(zval *object, zval ***gc_data, int *gc_data_count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
++{
++ *gc_data = NULL;
++ *gc_data_count = 0;
++ return zend_std_get_properties(object TSRMLS_CC);
++}
++/* }}} */
++
+ static HashTable *php_zip_get_properties(zval *object TSRMLS_DC)/* {{{ */
+ {
+ ze_zip_object *obj;
+@@ -2777,6 +2785,7 @@ static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(zip)
+ zip_object_handlers.clone_obj = NULL;
+ zip_object_handlers.get_property_ptr_ptr = php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr;
+
++ zip_object_handlers.get_gc = php_zip_get_gc;
+ zip_object_handlers.get_properties = php_zip_get_properties;
+ zip_object_handlers.read_property = php_zip_read_property;
+ zip_object_handlers.has_property = php_zip_has_property;
diff --git a/bug72446.patch b/bug72446.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1990705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72446.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 23:58:26 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in
+ gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
+
+---
+ NEWS | 2 ++
+ ext/gd/libgd/gd.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c b/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
+index 2c63aac..4dad95a 100644
+--- a/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
++++ b/ext/gd/libgd/gd.c
+@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ gdImagePtr gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++ if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sx)) {
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
+
+ /* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
+
diff --git a/bug72455.patch b/bug72455.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3c3660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72455.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+Backported from 5.5.37 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 6c5211a0cef0cc2854eaa387e0eb036e012904d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 21:51:42 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
+
+---
+ ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c b/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c
+index 194660d..3cbb913 100644
+--- a/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c
++++ b/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c
+@@ -681,6 +681,10 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic)
+ if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
+ block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
+ data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
++ if (data_size <= 0) {
++ php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Integer overflow in data size");
++ RETURN_FALSE;
++ }
+ data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
+ memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
+ memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
+@@ -726,6 +730,10 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
+ if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
+ block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
+ data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
++ if (data_size <= 0) {
++ php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Integer overflow in data size");
++ RETURN_FALSE;
++ }
+ data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
+ memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
+ memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
+
diff --git a/failed.txt b/failed.txt
index 9d57fb8..14a47b2 100644
--- a/failed.txt
+++ b/failed.txt
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
-===== 5.5.45-9 (2016-05-29)
+===== 5.5.45-10 (2016-06-23)
$ grep -r 'Tests failed' /var/lib/mock/*/build.log
-/var/lib/mock/el5i/build.log:Tests failed : 6
-/var/lib/mock/el5x/build.log:Tests failed : 2
+/var/lib/mock/el5i/build.log:Tests failed : 7
+/var/lib/mock/el5x/build.log:Tests failed : 3
/var/lib/mock/el6i/build.log:Tests failed : 5
/var/lib/mock/el6x/build.log:Tests failed : 1
/var/lib/mock/el7x/build.log:Tests failed : 0
el5i, el5x
+ Bug #33414 [1] (Comprehensive list of incorrect days returned after strotime() / date() tests) [ext/date/tests/bug33414-1.phpt]
Bug #66501: EC private key support in openssl_sign [ext/openssl/tests/bug66501.phpt]
Bug #64802: openssl_x509_parse fails to parse subject properly in some cases [ext/openssl/tests/bug64802.phpt]
el5i, el6i
diff --git a/php54.spec b/php54.spec
index d5982c5..ba036b9 100644
--- a/php54.spec
+++ b/php54.spec
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
Summary: PHP scripting language for creating dynamic web sites
Name: php
Version: 5.4.45
-Release: 9%{?dist}
+Release: 10%{?dist}
# All files licensed under PHP version 3.01, except
# Zend is licensed under Zend
# TSRM is licensed under BSD
@@ -188,6 +188,18 @@ Patch228: bug72114.patch
Patch229: bugoverflow.patch
Patch230: bug72135.patch
Patch231: bug72241.patch
+Patch232: bug66387.patch
+Patch233: bug72340.patch
+Patch234: bug72275.patch
+# For #72400, #72403, #72268
+Patch235: bug72400.patch
+Patch236: bug72339.patch
+Patch237: bug72298.patch
+Patch238: bug72402.patch
+Patch239: bug72433.patch
+Patch240: bug72434.patch
+Patch241: bug72455.patch
+Patch242: bug72446.patch
# Fixes for tests
# no_NO issue
@@ -927,6 +939,17 @@ rm -f ext/json/utf8_to_utf16.*
%patch229 -p1 -b .bugoverflow
%patch230 -p1 -b .bug72135
%patch231 -p1 -b .bug72241
+%patch232 -p1 -b .bug66387
+%patch233 -p1 -b .bug72340
+%patch234 -p1 -b .bug72275
+%patch235 -p1 -b .bug72400
+%patch236 -p1 -b .bug72339
+%patch237 -p1 -b .bug72298
+%patch238 -p1 -b .bug72402
+%patch239 -p1 -b .bug72433
+%patch240 -p1 -b .bug72434
+%patch241 -p1 -b .bug72455
+%patch242 -p1 -b .bug72446
# Fixes for tests
%patch301 -p1 -b .datetests2
@@ -1816,6 +1839,28 @@ fi
%changelog
+* Tue Jun 21 2016 Remi Collet <remi@fedoraproject.org> 5.4.45-10
+- Fix #66387: Stack overflow with imagefilltoborder
+- Fix #72340: Double Free Courruption in wddx_deserialize
+ CVE-2016-5772
+- Fix #72275: don't allow smart_str to overflow int
+- Fix #72400: prevent signed int overflows for string lengths
+- Fix #72403: prevent signed int overflows for string lengths
+- Fix #72268: Integer Overflow in nl2br(). (Stas)
+- Fix #72339: Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
+ CVE-2016-5766
+- Fix #72298: pass2_no_dither out-of-bounds access
+- Fix #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
+ CVE-2016-5768
+- Fix #72433: SPL use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC
+ CVE-2016-5771
+- Fix #72434: ZipArchive class use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC
+ CVE-2016-5773
+- Fix #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
+ CVE-2016-5769
+- Fix #72446: Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor()
+ CVE-2016-5767
+
* Sun May 29 2016 Remi Collet <remi@fedoraproject.org> 5.4.45-9
- Fix #71331: Uninitialized pointer in phar_make_dirstream
CVE-2016-4343
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-11-25 08:39:06 +0000