diff options
Diffstat (limited to '0009-curl-7.27.0-f206d6c0.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | 0009-curl-7.27.0-f206d6c0.patch | 69 |
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/0009-curl-7.27.0-f206d6c0.patch b/0009-curl-7.27.0-f206d6c0.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f904907 --- /dev/null +++ b/0009-curl-7.27.0-f206d6c0.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From 46890e837c3b27195e4b0285d221d900f2ad48cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eldar Zaitov <kyprizel@volema.com> +Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 23:22:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message: fix buffer overflow + +When negotiating SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication, the function +Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message() uses the data provided from the +server without doing the proper length checks and that data is then +appended to a local fixed-size buffer on the stack. + +This vulnerability can be exploited by someone who is in control of a +server that a libcurl based program is accessing with POP3, SMTP or +IMAP. For applications that accept user provided URLs, it is also +thinkable that a malicious user would feed an application with a URL to +a server hosting code targetting this flaw. + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html + +[upstream commit f206d6c055d1008f0edb6d5d5920f0f300b9983a] + +Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> +--- + lib/curl_sasl.c | 23 ++++++----------------- + 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/curl_sasl.c b/lib/curl_sasl.c +index ccb54a8..e42b850 100644 +--- a/lib/curl_sasl.c ++++ b/lib/curl_sasl.c +@@ -345,9 +345,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, + snprintf(&HA1_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); + + /* Prepare the URL string */ +- strcpy(uri, service); +- strcat(uri, "/"); +- strcat(uri, realm); ++ snprintf(uri, sizeof(uri), "%s/%s", service, realm); + + /* Calculate H(A2) */ + ctxt = Curl_MD5_init(Curl_DIGEST_MD5); +@@ -391,20 +389,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, + for(i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LEN; i++) + snprintf(&resp_hash_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); + +- strcpy(response, "username=\""); +- strcat(response, userp); +- strcat(response, "\",realm=\""); +- strcat(response, realm); +- strcat(response, "\",nonce=\""); +- strcat(response, nonce); +- strcat(response, "\",cnonce=\""); +- strcat(response, cnonce); +- strcat(response, "\",nc="); +- strcat(response, nonceCount); +- strcat(response, ",digest-uri=\""); +- strcat(response, uri); +- strcat(response, "\",response="); +- strcat(response, resp_hash_hex); ++ snprintf(response, sizeof(response), ++ "username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\",nonce=\"%s\"," ++ "cnonce=\"%s\",nc=\"%s\",digest-uri=\"%s\",response=%s", ++ userp, realm, nonce, ++ cnonce, nonceCount, uri, resp_hash_hex); + + /* Base64 encode the reply */ + return Curl_base64_encode(data, response, 0, outptr, outlen); +-- +1.7.1 + |