From 957e79c7dd6e93328f9e63c166b343d8034b5d2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Remi Collet <fedora@famillecollet.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2012 18:43:31 +0200
Subject: reorg repo

---
 mod_security.conf | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 mod_security.conf

(limited to 'mod_security.conf')

diff --git a/mod_security.conf b/mod_security.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7468a05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mod_security.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+
+LoadModule security2_module modules/mod_security2.so
+LoadModule unique_id_module modules/mod_unique_id.so
+
+<IfModule mod_security2.c>
+	# This is the ModSecurity Core Rules Set.
+
+	# Basic configuration goes in here
+	Include modsecurity.d/*.conf
+	Include modsecurity.d/activated_rules/*.conf
+
+	# Additional items taken from new minimal modsecurity conf
+	# Basic configuration options
+	SecRuleEngine On
+	SecRequestBodyAccess On
+	SecResponseBodyAccess Off
+	
+	# Handling of file uploads
+	# TODO Choose a folder private to Apache.
+	# SecUploadDir /opt/apache-frontend/tmp/
+	SecUploadKeepFiles Off
+	SecUploadFileLimit 10
+
+	# Debug log
+	SecDebugLog /var/log/httpd/modsec_debug.log
+	SecDebugLogLevel 0
+
+	# Audit log
+	SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
+	SecAuditLogRelevantStatus ^5
+	SecAuditLogType Serial
+	SecAuditLogParts ABIFHZ
+	SecAuditLog /var/log/httpd/modsec_audit.log
+
+	# Alternative mlogc configuration
+	#SecAuditLogType Concurrent
+	#SecAuditLogParts ABIDEFGHZ
+	#SecAuditLogStorageDir /var/log/mlogc/data
+	#SecAuditLog "|/usr/bin/mlogc /etc/mlogc.conf"
+
+	# Set Data Directory
+	SecDataDir /var/log/httpd/
+
+	# Maximum request body size we will
+	# accept for buffering
+	SecRequestBodyLimit 131072
+
+	# Store up to 128 KB in memory
+	SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072
+
+	# Buffer response bodies of up to
+	# 512 KB in length
+	SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
+
+	# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
+	# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
+	# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
+	# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
+	SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
+	"phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',severity:2"
+
+	# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
+	# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
+	# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
+	# _not_ to remove it altogether.
+	SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
+	"phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart request body \
+	failed strict validation: \
+	PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
+	BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
+	BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
+	DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
+	DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
+	HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
+	LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
+	SM %{MULTIPART_SEMICOLON_MISSING}, \
+	IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
+	IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
+	IH %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
+	
+	# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
+	SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "!@eq 0" \
+	"phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
+	
+	# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
+	# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_".  The following flags currently exist:
+	#
+	# MSC_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
+	#
+	SecRule TX:/^MSC_/ "!@streq 0" \
+	        "phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'ModSecurity internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
+</IfModule>
-- 
cgit